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Abstract. We present a formal, tool-supported approach to the design
and maintenance of access control policies expressed in the eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language (XACML). Our aim is to help de-
velopers evaluate the consequences of policy decisions in complex sit-
uations where security requirements change and access decisions may
depend on the external dynamic environment. The approach applies
the model-oriented specification language from the Vienna Development
Method (VDM++). An executable formal model of XACML access con-
trol is presented in VDM++. The use of the model to analyse and revise
both policies and requirements on the environment is illustrated through
an example. An approach to the practical problem of analysing access
control in virtual organisations with dynamic membership and goals is
proposed.
1 Introduction
For a multi-user computer system to be secure, the developer must ensure that
the people or systems using it are only allowed to perform legitimate actions.
The functionality that achieves this is often separated out into a distinct access
control policy which defines the response to access requests. In many situations,
the response given to a request depends on the environment in which the re-
quest is evaluated. For example, a request may be disallowed outside of regular
working hours, and so each time the request is made a clock will need to be
consulted. Such policies are termed context-sensitive (also context-aware or dy-
namic). Context-sensitivity adds complexity to the development and validation
of access control policies. They often need to satisfy requirements from different
domains, for example legal, technical and commercial. Conformance with each
of these sets of requirements must be checked any time the access control policy
is modified. Modern virtual organisations are composed of separate agents, each
with their own access control policies. They often work to volatile functional
requirements and so policies need to be updated accurately and quickly.
The goal of our current work is to assist the access control policy developer by
providing rapid feedback on design decisions. Formal techniques are well suited to
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this task because of the breadth and rigour of analysis that they afford. However,
our goal is pragmatic, so it is vital that formal techniques for policy design are
relevant to industry practice. Our specific aims are therefore to support policy
analysis in an existing and widely-used access control framework (rather than to
propose a new formalism), to focus on methods that can be supported by tools,
and to exploit the benefits of formal approaches but provide a low technical
barrier to their use by integrating with current and emerging industry practice.
We approach this by focussing on a substantial subset of the OASIS eXtensi-
ble Access Control Markup Language (XACML), providing a formal semantics
for it in the formal specification language of VDM++ [10]. The semantics is
similar in structure to XACML and includes environments, enabling analysis of
context-sensitive policies. The semantic model can be executed directly using the
VDMTools interpreter, providing a basis for testing and analysing proposed poli-
cies and environments. Test suites may be run against these interpreted models,
providing rapid feedback to the developer.
Section 2 contains a brief overview of access control, and in Section 3 gives
an overview of semantics for XACML policies in VDM++. The validation and
evolution of policies using the formal model are illustrated in Section 4. The
application of the model in the volatile environment of dynamic virtual organ-
isations is outlined in Section 5. We conclude by comparing related work and
identifying potential improvements to the coverage of the formal model and the
range of analyses supported.
2 Context-Sensitive Access Control in XACML
This section gives a simplified overview of XACML, pointing out how it is used
to describe context-sensitive access control policies. XACML [14] is the OASIS
standard access control policy language. It provides a policy language for de-
scribing access control policies and a request language for interrogating these
policies.
Fig. 1. XACML overview.
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Access control systems that implement XACML have the abstract structure
shown in Figure 1. A request to perform an operation on SYS (the system under
access control) is forwarded to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The PEP
translates the request into the XACML request language and passes it on to the
handler. In XACML a request is a triple containing multiple subjects, actions
and resources. However, we will follow [7] and [6] in restricting request triples to
contain a single subject, action and resource. We assume that the PEP is defined
to break any compound request into a set of requests and submit them singly,
then combine the results in whatever way the developer chooses.
The handler forwards the request, together with any relevant information
from the context, to the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PDP retrieves the
relevant policies from the Policy Access Point (PAP), which contains all the
access control policies for SYS. The PDP then evaluates the relevant access
control policies in the context and sends the response to the handler. The re-
sult is returned to the PEP where it is enforced as either permission or denial.
The decision of how to enforce the result returned by the PDP is in general
application-dependent and is not in the scope of our current formalisation.
The PAP may contain a number of arbitrarily nested policies. When faced
with a request, each policy must produce a single result, so a parent policy
contains an algorithm for combining the responses of all the child policies into a
single result. Policies may also contain a target – a set of subjects, resources, and
actions denoting the limits of the applicability of the policy. A policy is applied
to a request if the request matches the policy target, i.e. if the request subject,
resource and action are in the set of policy target subjects, resources and actions
respectively. If a request does not match the policy target – i.e. it relates to a
subject, resource or action outside the policy target – the policy will generate
the result “not applicable”. If the target is not present in the policy every request
will match.
The lowest-level policies contain sets of rules, together with a combining
algorithm. Like policies, rules in XACML may contain a target. They will also
contain an effect (permit or deny). Optionally, they may also contain a condition.
A condition is the part of a policy which is context-sensitive. It is a Boolean
function, and may include the subject, resource and action from the request
as well as arbitrary environment variables. The result of evaluating a condition
therefore varies according to the values of variables in the environment (or con-
text.) If a request matches a rule target the condition of the rule is evaluated.
Evaluating the condition will involve consulting the environment of the system.
If the condition evaluates to true the rule will return the effect of the system
(either permit or deny). If the condition evaluates to false the rule will return not
applicable. If the condition cannot be evaluated (perhaps because some system-
level environmental information is missing) the rule will return indeterminate.
Finally, if the request did not match the rule target not applicable is returned.
As an example, consider the access control policy for a document manage-
ment system designed to control access to documents within a chemical engi-
neering plant. Documents are held on a central database and access must be
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carefully controlled. Each document must be reviewed after it is written. Sup-
pose the initial stages of a project involve two documents – the hazard analy-
sis and the production plan. We begin by developing the access control policy
needed for these early stages. Suppose the developer is initially given two rules
to implement:
1. The hazard analysis must be signed off before anyone may write to
the production plan.
2. An author of a document cannot be the reviewer of that document.
The implementations of both these rules must be context-sensitive. If a request
is made to write to the production plan the first rule must be able to check if the
hazard analysis has been signed off. The second rule, a classic separation-of-duty
constraint, requires that it be possible to check authorship of any document. The
structure available in the environment to answer the context-related query may
vary in each case. The documents may be in XML format, with “signed-off”
and “authorship” fields, or the information may be recorded separately in a
database. The policy developer will not necessarily know in advance which of
these alternative implementations to assume. It is therefore important that the
developer can model the environment abstractly, without requiring a particular
implementation, but ensuring that the abstract model of the environment will
have all the relevant behaviours that the real environment may exhibit.
3 A Semantics for XACML
This section introduces the VDM++ formalism, then presents a semantics for
XACML in terms of an executable formal model in VDM++.
3.1 The VDM++ Formalism and Tools
The model is expressed in VDM++ [10], the object-oriented extension of the Vi-
enna Development Method (VDM) specification language [12, 1]. For a detailed
introduction to VDM and its support tools the reader is referred to [8] and
the VDM portal [15]. VDM++ models are composed of class definitions, each
of which may contain local state specified by typed instance variables. Type
definitions are given in terms of abstract basic types including token types for
representing structureless values. Complex types are constructed using record
and union constructors, set, sequence and mapping types. Type membership
is restricted by invariants. Functionality in each class is expressed in terms of
operations that may modify the values of the instance variables and auxiliary
functions that do not affect the local state. Operations and functions may be
specified implicitly by means of postconditions, or explicitly. In either case, re-
strictions on their domains are expressed by logical preconditions. Constants
may also be declared (as values). In our work on XACML, we remain within
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an executable subset of the modelling language, allowing our models of access
control policies to be readily analysed using the VDMTools interpreter.
VDM++ benefits from strong tool support and a record of industrial use [9].
Many industry applications of VDM use a “lightweight formal methods” ap-
proach that emphasises modelling over code verification and pays special atten-
tion to using strong tool support for model validation by testing. The intention
behind this approach to provide entry-level access to formal methods technology
without requiring users to learn advanced modelling and analysis techniques at
the outset. The existing tool set (VDMTools) includes a syntax and type checker,
an interpreter for executable models, test scripting and coverage analysis facili-
ties, program code generation and pretty-printing. These have the potential to
form a platform for tools specifically tailored to the analysis of access control
policies in an XACML framework. Advanced static analysis for VDM models
includes automatic proof obligation generation and automated proof support is
under development.
An access control policy in XACML can be thought of as a data structure
based on a set of complex data types. The XACML standard is a description
of these data types and of the evaluation functions over them. VDM++, with
its separation of data types and functionality, is an appropriate language to
describe access control policies. VDM++ also allows a clear encapsulation of
functionality within classes, which makes it particularly suitable for describing
the architectural model of an access control environment.
3.2 A Model of XACML
This section gives an overview of a formal model of access control in VDM++.
Throughout this section and Section 4 we use the interchange syntax of VDM++.
The extracts are drawn from the full VDM++ model1.
Fig. 2. Overview of the VDM++ model.
1 Available at http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/jeremy.bryans/VDMPPacmodel/
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Fig. 2 is an informal class diagram showing the structure of the VDM++
model. The structure of the model closely reflects that of XACML. The Request
class describes requests that a user may make. Policies are represented in objects
of the PAP class; individual rules may include conditions that are expressed in
expressions of the FExp class. The Evaluator collects together the functionality
of the XACML handler and Policy Decision Point. It evaluates a request with
respect to a PAP policy in an environment (an instance of the Env class). We
briefly consider each of the main classes in turn.
Request. As indicated in Section 2, we restrict requests to a single subject,
resource, and action. In the VDM++ these are instance variables of the
Request class. The Subject, Resource and Action types are drawn from the
PAP class but could be pulled out into a separate unit.
subject : PAP‘Subject;
resource : PAP‘Resource;
action : PAP‘Action
Policy Access Point: (PAP). In the VDM++ model, objects from the PAP
class contain a single instance variable pap of type PolicySet. A PolicySet
contains an optional Target, a set of elements from Policy and PolicySet, and
the name of the policy combining algorithm (of typeCombAlg).
PolicySet :: target : [Target]
components : set of (Policy|PolicySet)
policyCombAlg : CombAlg;
Target :: subjects : set of Subject
resources : set of Resource
actions : set of Action;
Policy :: target : [Target]
rules : set of Rule
ruleCombAlg : CombAlg;
CombAlg = <denyOverrides> | <permitOverrides>;
Rule :: target : [Target]
effect : Effect
cond : [FExp]
A policy contains an Target (optional, indicated by the [..]), a set of Rules,
and a combining algorithm name. The enumerated values <denyOverrides> and
<permitOverrides> act as pointers to the appropriate algorithms, defined in the
Evaluator class. Other possible combining algorithms are given in the XACML
Standard [14], but for simplicity we will model only these two here. Both these
algorithms may be applied to both policies and rules; a slight modification would
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allow us include algorithms which only apply to either policies or rules. The
effect of the rule is the value returned by the rule when a request is evaluated
against it. It can be one of the enumerated values <Permit>, <Deny>, <Indet>
or <NotApplicable>. The condition cond may contain an expression of the class
FExp.
The Environment (Env). An environment contains two mappings: the senv
represents a static environment mapping expression variables to types, and denv
represents a dynamic environment mapping expression variables to values.
senv : map FExp‘Var to SType;
denv : map FExp‘Var to Val
The senv component contains a record of the types of the variables in the dy-
namic component. This allows us to type check expressions evaluated within this
environment. The dynamic component of the environment contains the values
of each the variables. The abstract syntax of values is given below.
Val = AtomicVal | StructuredVal;
AtomicVal = bool | int | <Indet>;
StructuredVal = BoolArray | IntArray | VarArray;
BoolArray = map FExp‘Var to bool;
IntArray = map FExp‘Var to int;
VarArray = map FExp‘Var to (map FExp‘Var to bool)
An XACML implementation must provide support for arbitrary run time en-
vironments, whereas in our approach we build a simpler abstract model of the
environment that manifests the behaviour necessary to test the rules and poli-
cies that we design. For this reason our syntax of expressions is currently less
expressive than that offered by XACML. However, it is readily extensible.
Atomic values may be Boolean or integer, as well as the special value Indet
used to model situations where the environment fails to return a result. A
BoolArray is a map from variables to Booleans and an IntArray is a map
from variables to integers. A VarArray is a map to BoolArrays.
Condition Expressions (FExp). The syntax of expressions and the structure
of the environment are closely related. Objects from this class will be used to
build the conditions that form the context-sensitive part of rules. Each object
is an expression. In general, an environment and a request may need to be
provided in order to fully evaluate an expression, as it may contain references to
elements in both of them. An ordinary expression is one which only uses variable
names declared in the environment, and a full expression also uses the reserved
terms requester or resource. Before a full expression is evaluated, these are
instantiated with the name of the request subject and resource. Ordinary (non-
full) expressions take one of the following forms:
Expr = Var | Unary | Infix | Literal | ArrayLookup | VarArrayLookup;
Var :: vname : token;
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Unary :: op : <NOT>
body : Expr;
Infix :: left : Expr
op : <AND>|<OR>|<LT>
right : Expr;
Literal :: lit : boolLiteral | intLiteral;
boolLiteral :: <TRUE>|<FALSE>;
intLiteral :: <ZERO>|<ONE>|<TWO>|<THREE>|...
ArrayLookup :: aname : Var
index : Var;
VarArrayLookup :: aname : Var
index1 : Var
index2 : Var
A Var expression is a record with a single token field. Expressions may be negated
using the Unary type. Infix expressions may be conjunctions or disjunctions of
Boolean expressions, and integer expressions may be combined using less-than.
Literals may be Boolean or integer literals, and we include as many integers
as we need. Expressions may also look up values in environment Arrays. An
ArrayLookup contains the name of the array and the index to be looked up. A
VarArrayLookup contains the name of a VarArray and two indices. The first
index is the name of the Boolean array to be looked up, and the second is the
name of the index to be addressed within the Boolean array.
The syntax of full expressions (not shown here) extends the above by includ-
ing requester and resource as uninstantiated variables.
UnVar :: <requester>|<resource>
These may be used in the same way as instantiated variables, so full expressions
contain Var|UnVar where Var appears above.
Evaluator. The Evaluator class describes the evaluation of requests, com-
bining the functionality of the XACML handler and Policy Decision Point. It
contains four instance variables: a PAP, an environment Env, a request and the
instantiation mapping inst. The inst mapping will map the reserved terms
requester and resource to the actual requester and resource in the access con-
trol request triple. This allows requester and resource in any of the conditions
in the PAP to be bound to the current request subject and resource. The con-
structor takes a request, a PAP and an environment, and instantiates Inst from
the request. The operation evaluate then returns the effect of evaluating the
request req against the PAP pap in the environment env.
pap : PAP; -- an object of class PAP
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env : Env; -- an object of class Env
req : Request; -- an object of class Request
inst: Inst := mk_Inst({|->}); -- the instantiation mapping
The evaluate operation (below) invokes a different evaluator on the basis of the
combining algorithm.
public evaluate: () ==> PAP‘Effect
evaluate() ==
if (pap.GetpolicyCombAlg() = <denyOverrides>) then
return(evaluatePAPDenyOverrides())
elseif (pap.GetpolicyCombAlg() = <permitOverrides>) then
return(evaluatePAPPermitOverrides())
else
return(<NotApplicable>)
In the <denyOverrides> case, the evaluation operation returns a <Deny> if the
evaluation of any of the constituent policies returns a denial or indeterminate
response.
evaluatePAPDenyOverrides : () ==> PAP‘Effect
evaluatePAPDenyOverrides() ==
if exists p in set pap.Getpolicies() &
(is_(p,PAP‘Policy) and
(evaluatePolicy(p) = <Deny> or evaluatePolicy(p) = <Indet> ))
or
(is_(p,PAP‘PolicySet) and
(evaluatePolicySet(p) = <Deny> or evaluatePolicySet(p) = <Indet> ))
then return(<Deny>)
elseif exists p in set pap.Getpolicies() &
(is_(p,PAP‘Policy) and evaluatePolicy(p) = <Permit> ) or
(is_(p,PAP‘PolicySet) and evaluatePolicySet(p) = <Permit> )
then return(<Permit>)
else return(<NotApplicable>);
At the policy level, the rule combining algorithm again determines which evalu-
ation is applied. Policy evaluation also involves checking the target match. This
operation generalises to the case where evaluation is over a set of sub-policies.
evaluatePolicy : PAP‘Policy ==> PAP‘Effect
evaluatePolicy(p) ==
if targetmatch(p.target) then
(cases p.ruleCombAlg:
<denyOverrides> -> return(evaluateRulesDenyOverrides(p.rules)),
<permitOverrides> -> return(evaluateRulesPermitOverrides(p.rules)),
others -> return(<NotApplicable>)
end)
else -- target does not match
return(<NotApplicable>);
Finally, at the level of a single rule, the effect is returned if there is not condition
or the condition evaluates true in the current environment. Otherwise the rule
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returns <NotApplicable> if the condition evaluates false and <Indet> if the
condition can not be evaluated (e.g. is a required variable is not present in the
environment).
evaluateRule : PAP‘Rule ==> PAP‘Effect
evaluateRule(rule) ==
if targetmatch(rule.target) then
if rule.cond = nil
then return(rule.effect)
else
cases (rule.cond).Evaluate(req,env):
true -> return(rule.effect),
false -> return(<NotApplicable>),
<Indet> -> return(<Indet>)
end
else
return(<NotApplicable>);
4 Validating Access Control Policies using the Model
Our overall aim is to support the design and evolution of context-sensitive ac-
cess control policies. In particular, we wish to provide rapid feedback on the
characteristics of policies, or on the effects of changing policies, before they are
implemented. The formal model of XACML presented in Section 3 can provide
a basis for this form of evaluation.
The XACML model is written in the executable subset of VDM++. Ini-
tialised with an environment and a proposed policy, a set of test requests can
be evaluated by direct execution of the semantic model on the VDMTools inter-
preter. Based on the outcome of such an evaluation, the designer may choose to
modify either or both of the policy and the environment. For example, a policy
might be modified to add specific constraints, or the environment might have
to be extended in order to include external information required to facilitate a
new rule. The designer has an eye to the data that can be obtained from the
environment as well as the content of the policy itself. This process of test and
modification can go through several iterations, eventually yielding a model pol-
icy and environment. The policy can be implemented in a real XACML Policy
Access Point. The environment model specifies the external data that must be
obtainable from the real environment in order for the policy to behave correctly.
This section illustrates the process of iterative development using the exe-
cutable semantics of XACML. Using the simple example introduced in Section 2,
we first show an initial encoding of two elementary rules in an access control
policy and then illustrate the testing and subsequent modification of the policy.
Throughout we show how policies and tests are represented in VDM++, but in
practice we expect the user of a tool based on the semantic model to access it
through a more friendly interface.
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4.1 Testing Rules
Consider first the implementation of the two rules given in Section 1, namely
1. The hazard analysis must be signed off before anyone may write to
the production plan.
2. An author of a document can not be the reviewer of that document.
The developer begins by defining, in VDM++, a sample environment in which
the rules will be exercised. From the example rules, necessary elements in the
environment will include names for the two documents in question (haz an for
the hazard analysis and pp for the production plan) and the names of the two
relevant actions (write and review). To fully specify an example environment,
in which different subjects will have different privileges, the names of some sub-
jects (here Anne and Bob) are included. All these are defined in VDM++ as
variables from the class FExp.
haz_an : FExp‘Var = mk_FExp‘Var(mk_token("hazard_analysis")),
pp : FExp‘Var = mk_FExp‘Var(mk_token("production_plan")),
write : FExp‘Var = mk_FExp‘Var(mk_token("write")),
review : FExp‘Var = mk_FExp‘Var(mk_token("review")),
Anne : FExp‘Var = mk_FExp‘Var(mk_token("Anne")),
Bob : FExp‘Var = mk_FExp‘Var(mk_token("Bob"))
To construct the environment, we consider the two rules. Rule 1 contains a ref-
erence to hazard analysis being signed off. Since this will change over the course
of the document lifetime, it must be possible when the policy is being evaluated
to determine it from the environment. The developer does not need to know
at this stage the way in which the environment stores this information, merely
that it must be available. One possibility open to the developer is to include a
Boolean variable to indicate whether or not the document is signed off. This is a
straightforward solution, but if the policy expands, an environment with a large
number of such Boolean variables could become complex to maintain and update.
This becomes more important when we come to test the policy in environments
with different values. We therefore add a variable called signed off, of type
BoolArray, to the environment. It is instantiated in the dynamic environment
denv as a mapping from documents to Booleans. In the example environment
given we populate it with the map {haz an |-> true, pp |-> false}.
signed_off : FExp‘Var = mk_FExp‘Var(mk_token("signed_off")),
env : Env = new Env({...
signed_off |-> <BoolArray>},
{...
signed_off |->
{haz_an |-> true, pp |-> false}})
Rule 1 applies to any subject trying to write to the production plan, so we
introduce a symbol all subjects to represent the set of all subjects in the rule
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target. This is initialised to {Anne,Bob} and allows us to change the set of test
subjects without having to change the rule target. The XACML convention is
that if the target field is empty it applies to all possible subjects; we allow the
developer to use that convention but retain all subjects for clarity.
all_subjects : set of PAP‘Subject = {Anne,Bob},
hazanBeforePPRule: PAP‘Rule =
mk_PAP‘Rule(
mk_PAP‘Target(all_subjects,{pp},{write}), <Deny>,
new FExp(mk_FExp‘FUnary(<NOT>,
mk_FExp‘FArrayLookup(signed_off,haz_an))))
In order to evaluate Rule 2, it must be possible at any time to determine the
authorship of any document. To support this, a mapping author is added to the
envirnment as a VarArray which has type map Var to (map Var to bool). It
is instantiated in the dynamic environment as a map from document to people
to Booleans:
author : FExp‘Var = mk_FExp‘Var(mk_token("author")),
--
-- Environment 1
--
env : Env = new Env(
{author |-> <VarArray>,
signed_off |-> <BoolArray>},
{author |-> {haz_an |-> {Anne |-> false, Bob |-> true},
pp |-> {Anne |-> true, Bob |-> false}},
signed_off |-> {haz_an |-> true, pp |-> false}})
Rule 2 itself is a separation of duty constraint applying to all requests to review
a document, and denying any author the ability to review their own document.
This demonstrates the need to vary the result of a rule evaluation depending on
the relationship between the requester and the resource. It therefore makes use
of both the resource and requester reserved words. In order to evaluate the
effect of this rule, the evaluator must instantiate both of these variables via the
inst mapping.
requester : FExp‘UnVar = mk_FExp‘UnVar(<requester>),
resource : FExp‘UnVar = mk_FExp‘UnVar(<resource>),
reviewRule : PAP‘Rule =
mk_PAP‘Rule(mk_PAP‘Target(all_subjects,{haz_an,pp},{review}),
<Deny>,
new FExp(mk_FExp‘FVarArrayLookup(author,resource,requester))),
Following the XACML structure, these two rules are combined in a policy within
a PAP. Both the policy and the PAP have a denyOverrides rule combining
algorithm, so, unless a request is specifically permitted by the rules, it will be
denied. Formally:
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CompanyPolicy : PAP‘Policy =
mk_PAP‘Policy(mk_PAP‘Target(all_subjects,{haz_an,pp},{review,write}),
{hazanBeforePPRule,reviewRule},
<denyOverrides>),
pap : PAP = new PAP({CompanyPolicy}, <denyOverrides>)
The policy is tested by creating and passing requests to the evaluator. This can
be done in several environments. For example, we might define a second test
environment (Environment 2) in which authorship of each of the documents is
as in Environment 1, but haz an has not been signed off:
--
-- Environment 2
--
env : Env = new Env({author |-> <VarArray>,
signed_off |-> <BoolArray>},
{author |-> {haz_an |-> {Anne |-> false, Bob |-> true},
pp |-> {Anne |-> true, Bob |-> false}},
signed_off |-> {haz_an |-> false, pp |-> false}})
Table 1 shows the results of evaluating various test requests in each of these two
environments. At this stage the two given rules have been designed, but it is
clear that we are some way from a comprehensive access control policy.
Request Environment 1 Environment 2
Request(Anne,haz an,{write}) <NotApplicable> <NotApplicable>
Request(Anne,haz an,{review}) <NotApplicable> <NotApplicable>
Request(Bob,haz an,{write}) <NotApplicable> <NotApplicable>
Request(Bob,haz an,{review}) <Deny> <Deny>
Request(Anne,pp,{write}) <NotApplicable> <Deny>
Request(Anne,pp,{review}) <Deny> <Deny>
Request(Bob,pp,{write}) <NotApplicable> <Deny>
Request(Bob,pp,{review}) <NotApplicable> <NotApplicable>
Table 1. Results of request evaluation in two environments.
4.2 Policy Modification
The first test results highlight several issues. One is that no permission is given
for any requests: they are all either denied or out of scope of the policy, returning
the effect <NotApplicable>. This highlights a choice for the developer: what is to
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be the enforcement style of the policy? If the Policy Enforcement Point is permit-
biased it will permit requests for which the policy returns <NotApplicable>. In
this case the rules must be designed to deny all requests that should be for-
bidden. An alternative is the deny-biased PEP, which treats <NotApplicable>
as <Deny>. In this case a policy must be designed to permit all requests which
are to be allowed. If the developer wishes to make the behaviour of the pol-
icy independent of the style of the PEP, they must ensure that the policy does
not return <NotApplicable> for any requests which match the policy target.
In this example, we pursue this latter option. This is done by including a gen-
eral permission rule (permitRule) in the policy. This permits any requests to
write and review the two documents. When combined with the other rules using
<denyOverrides>, this means that requests not specifically denied by the other
rules in the policy will be permitted. The permitRule has no expression in the
condition clause, because it is not conditional on any aspect of the environment:
permitRule: PAP‘Rule = mk_PAP‘Rule(
mk_PAP‘Target(all_subjects,{pp,haz_an},
{write,review}),<Permit>,nil)
The CompanyPolicy is altered to include the new rule:
CompanyPolicy : PAP‘Policy =
mk_PAP‘Policy(mk_PAP‘Target(all_subjects,{haz_an,pp},{review,write}),
{hazanBeforePPRule,reviewRule,permitRule},
<denyOverrides>)
Testing these three rules in each of our environments has the anticipated results:
each <NotApplicable> is set to <Permit> (Table 2).
Request Environment 1 Environment 2
Request(Anne,haz an,{write}) <Permit> <Permit>
Request(Anne,haz an,{review}) <Permit> <Permit>
Request(Bob,haz an,{write}) <Permit> <Permit>
Request(Bob,haz an,{review}) <Deny> <Deny>
Request(Anne,pp,{write}) <Permit> <Deny>
Request(Anne,pp,{review}) <Deny> <Deny>
Request(Bob,pp,{write}) <Permit> <Deny>
Request(Bob,pp,{review}) <Permit> <Permit>
Table 2. Test results for policy independent of PEP bias.
4.3 Environment Modification
Another problem highlighted by the test results is that requests by both Anne
and Bob to write to haz an, and by Bob to review haz an, are permitted, even
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though it has been signed off. This is an inadequacy of the rules as given, which
do not cover that explicitly. To deal with this, we could propose a rule which
refuses any action on a document after it has been signed off, for example:
NoActionAfterSignoffRule : PAP‘Rule =
mk_PAP‘Rule(mk_PAP‘Target(all_subjects,{haz an,pp},{review,write}),
<Deny>,
new FExp(mk_FExp‘FArrayLookup(signed_off,resource)))
Let us assume that, through analysing the test results, the developer realises a
further requirement
3. For each document, writing and reviewing phases must not overlap.
Implementing this rule will require a new environment variable, a Boolean array
(completed). For each document, this is to be set to true when the writing
phase is over and it is ready for review. The following two rules will keep the
writing and reviewing phases separate:
NoWriteIfCompletedRule : PAP‘Rule =
mk_PAP‘Rule(mk_PAP‘Target(all_subjects,{haz an,pp},{write}),
<Deny>,
new FExp(mk_FExp‘FArrayLookup(completed,resource))),
NoReviewUntilCompletedRule : PAP‘Rule =
mk_PAP‘Rule(mk_PAP‘Target(all_subjects,{haz an,pp},{review}),
<Deny>,
new FExp(mk_FExp‘FUnary(<NOT>,
mk_FExp‘FArrayLookup(completed,resource))))
These three rules can be combined into a separate policy:
CompletionPolicy : PAP‘Policy =
mk_PAP‘Policy(mk_PAP‘Target(all_subjects,{haz an,pp},{write,review}),
{NoWriteIfCompletedRule,NoReviewUntilCompletedRule,
NoActionAfterSignoffRule},
<denyOverrides>),
This new policy can then be added to the PAP:
pap : PAP =
new PAP({CompanyPolicy,CompletionPolicy}, <denyOverrides>)
A value for the mapping can be added to the dynamic part of each test en-
vironment. In this case we add {completed |-> {haz an |-> false, pp |->
false}}. Testing the new PAP in the two environments gives the results shown
in Table 3. In Environment 1, the only requests now permitted are requests by
Anne and Bob to write to pp. In Environment 2 there is an inconsistency. Re-
quests to write to both haz an and pp are allowed. This has happened because
haz an has been signed off without being completed. This inconsistency would
be unacceptable in the implementation, and an appropriate safeguard would
need to be put in place. However, modelling such an inconsistent environment is
valuable, because doing so can help to identify environmental assumptions made
by the policy.
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Request Environment 1 Environment 2
Request(Anne,haz an,{write}) <Deny> <Permit>
Request(Anne,haz an,{review}) <Deny> <Deny>
Request(Bob,haz an,{write}) <Deny> <Permit>
Request(Bob,haz an,{review}) <Deny> <Deny>
Request(Anne,pp,{write}) <Permit> <Permit>
Request(Anne,pp,{review}) <Deny> <Deny>
Request(Bob,pp,{write}) <Permit> <Permit>
Request(Bob,pp,{review}) <Deny> <Deny>
Table 3. Test Results in environment augmented with separated phases.
5 An Application: Access Control Design for Dynamic
Coalitions
We have proposed a semantic model of XACML which serves as a tool for the
iterative development of access control policies. The presentation in this paper
has focussed on the formal aspects, but it is also important to consider the way
in which the model can be used. One of our motivations for addressing this topic
formally has been the need to develop and and maintain access control policies
for dynamic coalitions. In this section, we show how the formal model can be
used in this domain.
Dynamic coalitions (often called virtual organisations or virtual enterprises)
are opportunistic collaborations that form around business needs and opportu-
nities. Examples include coalitions of companies involved in designing, assessing
and manufacturing a new chemical compound or agencies collaborating in an
emergency relief scenario. Members of dynamic coalitions are agents, each hav-
ing their own resources and policies for controlling access to them. However,
within a coalition, some additional access is given to other coalition members in
order to achieve the coalition’s goal. The members agree a joint workflow for the
common task, and adapt their individual access control policies if necessary to
accommodate the workflow.
Dynamic coalitions evolve in real time as members join and leave, and as
workflows are modified to adapt to changing business goals. At each step in the
evolution, each member must make a trade-off between the risks and the benefits
of modifying their access control policies to deal with the changed workflow
or coalition membership. A source of complexity in this process is the need
to determine the consistency of policy modifications with the member’s own
policies.
The executable formal model can be used to assist trade-off analysis by pro-
viding designer feedback on potential policy modifications. The process is ilus-
trated in Fig. 3. Access control requirements can be derived from a new or
changed workflow (using tools such as [5]) and these are split into sub-policies,
one for each coalition member. These sub-policies represent the access policy
that each member needs to deliver in order to satisfy the needs of the coalition.
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Fig. 3. Evolution of Access Control Policies in Dynamic Coalitions
Each coalition member has to decide independently if the proposed adap-
tions to their current policy are acceptable. They are faced with two questions:
first, “Wwhat access privileges to my resources need to be granted to other
members in the course of executing this workflow?” and second, “Will adding
these new privileges to my existing access control policy violate my own secu-
rity policy?” The proposed policy can be automatically encoded in the formal
model (as demonstrated in [4] for context-free XACML) and combined with the
formal model of the current access control policy. This can be tested using the
VDMTools interpreter tests derived from the member’s own information security
policy. Any failures are presented to the decision maker. If any member decides
that the policy is unacceptable, they can do more than simply signal disap-
proval. For every test that fails they may use the formal model to investigate
precisely why it failed, and which particular parts of the access control policy
were invoked. They can use this information to propose alternative workflows
to the collaboration. Once all members agree on a workflow, they add the new
access control policy to their current policies and may then begin to execute the
workflow.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a VDM++ model for a substantial subset of XACML and
shown how this can be used for developing context-sensitive access control poli-
cies. The utility of the approach has been demonstrated on a small but realistic
example development of an access control policy fragment, showing how VDM-
Tools can be used to analyse prototype policies and provide rapid feedback to
the developer. In particular, the modelling and testing process helps to drive out
requirements on both the policy and environment to be implemented. We have
also outlined the value of the formal model in the development and evolution of
access control policies in dynamic coalitions.
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Current research addresses a variety of semantic models of context-sensitive
access control policies. Constraint logic programming in Datalog has been used
in several formalisations of access control in general(e.g. [6]) and of specific policy
languages such as SecPAL [2]. Few, if any, of these formalisations deal directly
with XACML. The policy modelling formalism RW [16] may be translated to
XACML. Its semantics permit model checking with respect to a goal involving a
combination of reading and manipulating propositional variables. Model check-
ing of access control policies derived from XACML has also been demonstrated in
Alloy [11], where the authors present several ordering relations between policies
and use these to specify policy properties. Event systems have been proposed as
a semantic model for dynamic access control policies in [13], where the authors
show how to prove that an access control policy refines a given event system
specification. The authors do not relate their work to the XACML specification.
The goal of our current work is to assist the access control policy developer
by providing rapid feedback on design decisions.How far have we gone towards
achieving this? Our approach has a formal basis but the goal is pragmatic and
this has led to the use of a tool-supported model-oriented formalism and a test-
based approach to model exploration. The use of a model-oriented formalism
such as VDM++ makes it relatively easy to build a formal model that has a very
similar structure to the XACML framework, easing translation of the validated
policy model into its implementation. The use of a model-oriented formalism
makes validation by testing straightforward. We have made this a priority as we
wish to support evolution of models that may already have legacy test sets and
we also want to have a low technical barrier to the use of the formal model.
The formal model that we have developed is of course expressed in a nota-
tion that will not be familiar to the majority of security engineers. It would be
preferable if users could invoke the model through a tailor-made interface that
allows the definition of XACML rules, policies and environments and allows the
execution of the model on test requests. It is straightforward to construct such an
interface using the VDMTools API, allowing the model to be exercised directly
by the user without them having to face the formalism directly.
There are some limitations to the proposed framework, and these are being
addressed in current and future work. These mainly concern the expressiveness of
the model and the fact that the analysis capability is currently based on testing.
Not all of the XACML Standard [14] is so far modelled, but many of the
remaining extensions are technically straightforward, including the extension to
cover the remaining four policy combination algorithms and a capability for the
policy developer to define their own combination algorithms. Requests can be
extended to encompass sets of subjects, resources and actions. When returning
an effect to the PEP, an XACML policy may also return obligations which must
be carried out by the PEP in addition to enforcing the effect. Such obligations
can modify the environment. For example, a log on policy might permit a user
to log on if the number of unsuccessful attempts is suitably small, and oblige the
PEP to increment this number with every denied request. Allowing the policy
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to modify its own environment directly will allow us to model the ability of a
user to modify other users’ access rights.
Currently our policy validation approach is based on testing. We would like
to extend this to include the possibility of proving that policies meet key infor-
mation security objectives. Automating this would utilise on proof technology
for VDM which is currently being developed.
Our work allows the decision maker to see the implications of changes to ac-
cess control policies. We would like to extend it to allow the user to explore the
consequences of access control decisions on information flow in dynamic coali-
tions. In [3] we present a way of formally modelling a range of dynamic coalitions
in order to investigate information flow properties between the members. Com-
bined with the work presented here, this would allow the decision maker to ask
“what-if” questions based on possible future scenarios. Here again, an intuitive
interface, via the tool API, will be important.
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